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7.1  Introduction 
Chile’s experience under the Unidad Popular government of President Sal- 
vador Allende is a unique blend of socialism and populism that has not been 
present in other Latin  American populist experiences.  It was not merely  an 
unsustainable expansion  of  aggregate demand to achieve distributive goals. 
Marxist ideology played a key role in the Unidad Popular economic program, 
as the ultimate goal was to replace the capitalist system with socialism. 
Most of  the economic discussion  during the initial period  of  the Allende 
government was focused on the massive and deep structural changes that were 
being  implemented  in  the  Chilean  economy.  These  involved  a  substantial 
transfer  of  assets  and  resources  from  the  private  sector to the  state. Even 
though income redistribution was a high-priority  goal for the Unidad Popular, 
the sharp and fast increases in real wages had an additional purpose: they were 
intended to increase the workers’ political support for the program so that the 
government could advance with the structural changes from a strong base. 
Macroeconomic policies  initially  played  a highly  supportive role for the 
implementation of the structural changes that the Unidad Popular promoted. 
But, as point out by  Dornbusch  and Edwards (1989), a sharp expansionary 
macroeconomic program is implemented by populists without any regard for 
internal or external constraints. Therefore, eventually, the initial success ends 
in complete failure. 
The second section of this paper provides a short overview of the Chilean 
economy before  1970. It also includes the Unidad Popular’s particular diag- 
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nosis and perceptions of the Chilean economy and its economic proposals. As 
will become clear later on, populism is only one aspect of  a more complex 
picture. Section 7.3 studies the deep structural reforms with a special discus- 
sion for each one of  the main sectors: copper nationalization, land reform, 
bank statization, and industry takeover. Various effects of these reforms, in- 
cluding the uncertainty that they generated over property rights, are discussed 
at the end of the section. Section 7.4 provides an overview of the macroeco- 
nomic policies and their results. There it becomes clear that, after a seemingly 
successful beginning, the Unidad Popular experiment ended in a full collapse. 
Section 7.5 provides the conclusions. 
7.2  The Chilean Economy before 1970 and the 
Unidad Popular Perspective 
7.2.1  Selected Aspects of the Chilean Economy before 1970 
During the 1950-70 period, Chilean economic performance was character- 
ized by  chronic and high inflation, moderate growth, and frequent balance of 
payments crises. In fact, the country’s economy constituted one of the proto- 
type cases used on the old structuralist-monetarist controversy. On the other 
hand, Chile had for a long time a very stable democratic political system that 
constituted a hallmark among Latin American countries. 
A highly  schematic description of  the two administrations prior to  1970 
highlights the elements that follow.  I  The government of President Jorge Ales- 
sandri (1958-64)  was elected with  the support of  conservative and center- 
right parties, obtaining 34% of  the votes. Initially, its main economic focus 
was inflation stabilization. Over the longer term, its perspective included two 
main elements: (1) After the success of the anti-inflation program it was con- 
sidered that the improved economic conditions would automatically stimulate 
growth. (2) The distributive problems would mainly be solved by the trickling 
down of the economic expansion. The Christian Democrat administration of 
President Eduardo Frei (1964-70)  came to power with an absolute majority 
of 56% of the popular vote. It was supported by a spectrum of political parties 
spanning from right to center. The government’s main economic focus was the 
implementation of  basic structural changes such as the land reform process 
and  the  Chilean participation  in  the  ownership of  the Big  Copper Mines 
(owned by American companies at that time). The Christian Democrats’ long- 
run perspective could by synthetized as an attempt to redistribute with growth, 
in a scenario of changes to the ownership structure of some economic sectors 
(copper, agriculture). 
The  Frei  government,  which  preceded  the  Unidad  Popular  period,  at- 
I. For a detailed analysis and review of the economic policies of  these two governments see 
Ffrench-Davis (1973). 177  The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience 
tempted some basic structural reforms that were slowly implemented in order 
not to impair macro stability. In this respect,  there was a certain perception 
that structural reforms could generate short-run disequilibriums. Thus, when 
there was an accumulation of  inflationary pressures, priority was to be given 
to the restoration of macro stability. The agrarian reform process was imple- 
mented to change the existing skewed pattern of land tenure and to incorporate 
the peasants to the political  and economic structure. “Chileanization” of  the 
Big Copper Mines implied that Chile acquired a 5 1% share of the ownerships 
of the big mines through bargaining. Government expenditures on social areas 
were increased and oriented mainly toward middle- and low-income groups. 
At  the  same time,  the  government  provided  guidelines  for  wage  readjust- 
ments, which included a 100% backward CPI indexation. 
During the  1960s there was a sharp increase in political and social activity. 
The number of registered voters grew from 1.5 million people in 1958 to more 
than 3.5 million people in 1970; the percentage of voters with respect to total 
population, which had been around 15% prior to 1960, went up to almost 30% 
by  1970 (Bitar  1979).  Furthermore, the  number  of  people  affiliated with 
unions doubled during the Frei government.  In a six-year span, blue-collar 
union  membership  increased  by  38%,  white-collar  union  membership  in- 
creased by  90%, and peasant union membership grew from less than 2,000 
people (1964) to more than 114,000 people (1970); (see table 7.1). 
A synthesis of the evolution of  the main macroeconomic variables during 
the Frei government,  using annual averages for the  1965-70  period,  is pro- 
vided in table 7.2. The growth rate (GDP) was 3.9%, while inflation reached 
26%; the national unemployment  rate was 5.6%; the increase of  real wages 
was 9.7% per year; and the level of the fiscal deficit (as a percentage of GDP) 
was 2.1%. Table 7.2 also provides the evolution of these variables for each 
year between 1968 and 1970. It is clear from these figures that the first part of 
the  Frei  government  had, in  general, a better performance  with  respect  to 
growth and inflation than that corresponding to the latter part. 
Table 7.3 provides the evolution of external-sector variables for the  1968- 
70 period.  Total exports were  more than  $1.1  billion  (in  U.S. dollars),  of 
which copper had a share larger than 75%. The 1968-70  period was positively 
influenced by the high world price of copper, which reached its all-time high 
Table 7.1  Number of People Affiliated with Unions in Chile 
(Number of Affiliates) 
Blue-Collar Workers  White-Collar Workers  Peasants  Total 
1958  154,650  119,666  2,030  276,346 
1964  142,958  125,926  1,658  270,542 
1970  197,651  239,323  114,112  55 1.086 
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Table 7.2  Selected Macroeconomic Variables in Chile, 1965-70 
Annual 
Economic  Annual  National  Increase of 
Growth  Inflation  Unernploy-  Real  Fiscal 
(GDP)  Rate (CPI)  rnent Rate  Wages  Deficit 




2.9  27.9  4.9  -  2.0  1.5 
2.9  29.3  5.5  4.3  0.4 
3.6  34.9  5.1  8.5  2.7 
Average, 1965-70  3.9  26.0  5.6  9.7  2.1 
Sources: Col.  1,  2, 3, and 5: ODEPLAN and Central Bank. 
Note: All figures are percentages; col. 5 is % of GDP. 
Table 7.3  External Sector Variables for the Period Prior to 1970 
(in Millions of  US. Dollars) 
Current  Level of 
Exports  Imports  Account  Balance of  International 
FOB  CIF  Balance  Payments  Reserves 
I968  91 1  802  -  135  118  125 
1969  1,173  921  -6  175  285 
1970  1,112  956  -81  114  394 
Source: Central Bank. 
in real terms during these years.  Regarding international reserves, it had al- 
ways been  at the  two-digit  level  before  1968. The relatively  large level of 
foreign reserves achieved in  1970 ($394 million;  i.e., almost five months of 
imports) was considered by the Frei government as an indicator of responsible 
economic performance. 
Popular perceptions about the Frei government in 1970 were mixed. On the 
one hand, there  had  been  a good  initial performance  during the  first three 
years, when  growth  increased  and inflation  was reduced.  But on the  other 
hand, at the  end, there was  a sense of frustrated expectations  between  the 
increased political and social participation  and the expected economic  out- 
come. In  this respect it is interesting to note that in spite of a sustained and 
relatively  important  increase of  real  wages during the Frei government,  the 
number of  strikes increased considerably (see table 7.4). Moreover, the mac- 
roeconomic  responsibility  to contain inflationary  pressures,  which prevailed 
from 1967 on, was neither supported by nor understood by most of the work- 
ers, even though there was no deterioration of  real wages and no significant 
increase of unemployment. 
Perceptions about the evolution of the economy during the Frei government 
(i.e., a good performance  at the beginning and a sharp slowdown later) hurt 179  The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience 
Table 7.4  Number of Strikes and Evolution of Real Wages 
1960-64”  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
Number of strikes  98  142  586  693  648  1,127  1,580 
Annual increase of  .o  13.9  10.8  13.5  -2.0  4.3  8.5 
real wages (%) 
~  ~~~~~  ~~~ 
Sources: Number of strikes: Martner (1988); real wages: Ffrench-Davis (1973). 
‘Figures provided correspond to the total for the period, i.e., the total number of strikes was 98 
during  1960-64;  0 was the annual average and the total change of  real wages in the  1960-64 
period. 
the Christian Democrats’ presidential candidate in 1970, who finished third in 
the election. Salvador Allende, as head of a coalition of left and center-left 
parties (the Unidad Popular), was elected President with 36% percent of the 
vote.2 
7.2.2 
According to the Unidad Popular (UP), the Chilean economy presented 
four major characteristics by  1970 that  had  to be corrected.  According to 
them, the economy was monopolistic, (externally) dependent, oligarchic, and 
capitali~tic.~  In  what  follows,  we provide the diagnosis of  these problems 
from the UP’S perspective. 
The following indicators for the 1960s provided the evidence on the alleged 
monopolistic nature of the economy (i.e., its degree of concentration): (a)  248 
firms controlled all of the economic sectors, and  17% of all enterprises con- 
centrated 78% of  total assets (Alaluf  1971). (6)  In industry, 3% of  the firms 
controlled more than 50% of value added and almost 60% of capital. (c) In 
agriculture, 2%  of  the farms owned 55% of  the land. (d)  In mining, three 
foreign (U.S.) companies controlled “large mining” copper production, which 
represented 60% of Chilean exports by  1970. (e) In wholesale trade, 12 enter- 
prises (which represented 0.5% of the total) accounted for 44% of  all sales. 
cf) In banking, the state bank (Banco del Estado) controlled close to 50% of 
all deposits and credits. However, it was pointed out that 3 banks (of a total of 
26  private  banks) controlled more than  half  of  the remaining 50%  (Bitar 
1979). 
These big monopolists had allegedly increased their share and their profits 
thanks to special state measures, like preferential credit lines, subsidies, spe- 
cial tax incentives, tariff differentials, and special access to foreign exchange 
The Unidad Popular Diagnosis of the Chilean Economy 
2. The candidate who finished second (former President Jorge Alessandri) got 35% of the vote, 
while the candidate of the Christian Democrats (Radomiro Tomic) got 28%. The total number of 
voters was 3 million, and the difference between Allende and Alessandri was less than 40,000 
votes. 
3. For a deeper discussion of these issues see Aranda and Martinez (1970). Caputo and Pizarro 
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(Alaluf  1971). In short, and according to a UP analyst, “the role of the state 
has always been to favor large monopolistic capital and its fundamental inter- 
ests” (Ramos 1972). 
Different aspects were pointed out on the issue of  Chile’s external depen- 
dence, including  (a) the  mono-export  nature of  the country,  where copper 
(large, medium, and small mines) represented more than 75% of total exports. 
This implied that fluctuations of the copper price in world markets would have 
a major impact upon the Chilean balance of payments and upon government 
revenues. Also of  note was (b)  the relatively  high profit remittances by for- 
eigners, which represented around 20% of exports, and (c) the high share of 
multinationals in Chilean industry. Of the largest  100 industrial firms at the 
end of the 1960s, 61 had foreign participation. 
According to Vuskovic (1970), the significant presence of foreign firms led 
to high dependence  because of two main reasons.  (1) Imported technology 
determined that Chile’s production methods were copied from the outside. (2) 
Chile also acquired the developed countries consumption pattern, that is, the 
“demonstration effect.” In synthesis, foreign forces imposed what to consume 
and what to produce. These issues highlighted the increasing importance and 
presence of foreign capital.  And, moreover, the Chilean bourgeoisie had be- 
gun to acquire a pattern of preferences and interests that were more identified 
with international capital than with national interests. 
The oligarchic feature was justified on the highly skewed income distribu- 
tion of the 1960s. While the poorest 10% of the population had a 1.5% share 
of total income, the highest 10% income group had a 40.2% share of income. 
The ratio between the income of both groups was 1 to 27.4 
Given the above characteristics,  and from the UP viewpoint,  the fruits of 
Chilean economic development  were  highly concentrated  on a small  privi- 
leged elite, thereby excluding low-income groups from the benefits. Accord- 
ing to Vuskovic (1970), this process was self-perpetuating and worked in the 
following way: (1) The inequitable income distribution generated a given pat- 
tern of consumption and demand, and thus the market was dominated by the 
goods in demand from the high-income groups. Accordingly, modem firms’ 
production was designed only to satisfy this type of  demand. (2) There existed 
a dual productive system, with a modem high-technology sector and a back- 
ward one. Only the modem sector incorporated technological progress in their 
production of goods for the high-income groups, while the backward  sector 
remained  stagnant. The increasing participation  of foreign investment  rein- 
forced the prevailing dual structure of the economy. (3) Due to the relatively 
reduced volume of goods demanded by the high-income groups, and given its 
wide spectrum, modem firms produced a low level of output; therefore, they 
were operating at an inadequately  low scale with a poor efficiency level.  In 
4.  At the end of  the 1960s the Chilean Gini coefficient was 0.51, lower than Brazil (0.58)  and 
Mexico (0.58) but higher than Argentina (0.44)  (Bitar 1979). 181  The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience 
short, the production  structure was inefficient,  as it  produced  mostly  non- 
essential goods for high-income groups. The small output scale led to a higher 
monopolistic concentration  level, which reinforced the skewed initial income 
distribution pattern. 
To  summarize the  UP perspective,  Chile was characterized  by  a vicious 
circle, where the unequal  original  income distribution  pattern  generated  a 
highly  monopolistic  productive  structure,  which  reinforced  the  existing 
skewed  income pattern.  The structure of  the economy got  more and more 
oriented toward the satisfaction of consumption patterns of the high-income 
groups, while there existed stagnation of productive sectors producing (essen- 
tial or basic) wage goods for the majority. The income and wealth inequalities 
led to a high degree of concentration of power, that is, only a few had control 
upon  the  main  decisions. Thus, the  interrelationship  between  political  and 
economic power reinforced the prevailing structure of the country. In order to 
change the economic conditions it was required to alter substantially the prop- 
erty structure. This would  generate a different  demand pattern  that  would 
stimulate the production of  basic goods consumed by the big majority. Then, 
economic resources would  not  be wasted in the production  of  nonessential 
goods (Vuscovic 1970; Bitar 1979). 
7.2.3  The Unidad Popular Economic Proposals 
The UP program made an explicit statement about its anti-imperialist, anti- 
oligarchist, and anti-monopolist  nature, which set the tone for the deep struc- 
tural changes that it proposed to follow. As a counterpart, the program stated 
that it would benefit  workers in general (blue collar and white collar), peas- 
ants, and small entrepreneurs, that is, the big national majority. The UP gov- 
ernment was going to be a historical experiment where the implementation of 
the transition toward socialism would be carried out using the existing insti- 
tutional structure. Two elements were required to facilitate this transition: sta- 
tization of the means of production and increased popular participation. 
The political objectives of the UP were stated very clearly (Martner 1988). 
The alleged purpose was the establishment of  the most democratic regime in 
Chilean history through the transfer of power from the dominant groups to the 
workers  and  the peasants. To  achieve  this,  Chilean  workers  would have  to 
acquire real power and use it effectively. The purpose of the structural changes 
was to “overcome capitalism.” What was at stake was the replacement of the 
then-current economic structure for the construction of socialism. 
The UP structural reforms had a wide and deep coverage, including (a)  the 
nationalization  of  Chile’s  main  basic  resources-copper  (the Big  Copper 
Mines), coal, nitrate, iron and steel-which  would imply a sharp confronta- 
tion  with  U.S.  companies,  (b)  the  expansion of  the  Social Property  Area, 
which implied the statization of the largest industrial enterprises, (c)  the inten- 
sification of  agrarian reform, (d)  statization of the banking  system, and (e) 
state control of the main wholesale trade and distribution firms. 182  Felipe Larrain and Patricio Meller 
In short, the structural reforms aimed to put the control of  the means of 
production in the hands of the state. The advantages of and the rationale for 
this objective were given as follows (Romeo 1971). (1) If  the state achieved 
the control of the means of production, it would be in a better position to make 
economic decisions using  a social criteria that  would consider the welfare 
preferences of the large national majority (i.e., the workers). (2) This control 
would produce an increase of  the economic surplus controlled by  the state. 
With the additional resources obtained, the state would be able to plan and to 
guide economic development in a direction that would benefit the large major- 
ity.  (3) In fact, “The main problem is not efficiency, but power; that is, who 
controls the economy and for whom? . . . What is at stake is the property of 
the means of production by a small minority; then, the real economic issues 
are: Who has the power to set prices, and therefore profits, and who captures 
the economic surplus and decides how to re-invest it. . . . To focus the discus- 
sion on efficiency avoids discussing who really has the economic power, and 
why a small minority who owns the means of production is able to subjugate 
the majority”. In  synthesis, as Minister of  Economics Pedro Vuskovic de- 
clared, soon after Allende took office, “State control is designed to destroy the 
economic basis of  imperialism and the ruling class by  putting an end to the 
private ownership of  the  means of  production” (as quoted in Moss  1973, 
One view inside the Unidad Popular stated that short-run macroeconomic 
policies were complementary and supportive of  structural reforms, showing 
in this way that “it is possible to make deep structural reforms and at the same 
time achieve important positive results in income redistribution, growth, infla- 
tion, and employment” (Garcia 1971). This, it has been explained, was due to 
the fact that even traditional macroeconomic policies have implicitly a class 
element: “short-run policies are, by  definition, a tool to maintain the status 
quo,” that is, these tools are not only the expression of a given institutional 
environment, but they are also oriented toward its consolidation. In  this re- 
spect, UP macroeconomic policies cannot be analyzed separately; “this would 
be a serious analytical mistake. . . . They should be examined in the prevail- 
ing environment which would provide the rational of why was done what was 
done” (Garcia 1971). 
In a distinct perspective, it is argued that the control of inflation was really 
a key UP objective due to political and economic reasons (Bianchi 1975). At 
the political level, the UP had pointed out during the campaign that it would 
get rid of inflation, and it criticized previous governments for their incapacity 
to control this problem. Moreover, due to the proximity of municipal elections 
(March 1971), the UP government wanted to show quickly an  indicator of 
success. At the economic level, given the fact that the goal of income redistri- 
bution was going to be implemented through increases in nominal wages, it 
was important to slow down inflation to ensure an increase in real wages. 
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The key elements that provided the basis of  the UP macro policy were the 
following: (a) The Chilean economy presented a large level of unused capac- 
ity and high unemployment. (b) There existed a high level of  international 
reserves and industrial stocks. As has been pointed out (Griffith-Jones 1980), 
UP economists made no comments with respect to the limitations related to 
the following elements: (1) Specific sectoral capacity levels may be very dif- 
ferent from global figures. (2) The utilization of available unused capacity is 
an element of the “once and for all” nature, that is, you can use it only once. 
(3) There  was  the  mechanistic  perception  that  structural  transformations 
would very quickly help solve macro problems. 
The main economic tools for short-run macroeconomic policy were the fol- 
lowing (Garcia 1971): (a)  Nominal wage readjustment and price control. This 
would lead to increased real wages, which would then constitute the main 
redistributive mechanism. Moreover, higher real  wages would increase the 
demand for basic goods leading to higher levels of  production and employ- 
ment. This process would reactivate and expand the economy using the exist- 
ing unused capacity. (b) Increased public expenditures would complement the 
higher real wages in reactivating the economy. (c) Passive monetary and credit 
policy would provide the required liquidity for the expansion of the economy; 
monetary policy  should not  act as a brake  to  stop reactivation. (d)  There 
would be a fixed nominal exchange rate, which would help to avoid cost pres- 
sures upon domestic production. (e) The nationalization of basic resources 
(copper) would expand exports and therefore provide additional foreign ex- 
change.  cf) The existence of  a relatively high initial level of  international 
reserves would provide the adjustment valve through imports, for eventual 
disequilibrium problems. 
The UP view of  anti-inflation policy was based on the following elements 
(Griffith-Jones 1980): (a) Inflation is really a structural phenomenon. Price 
control, elimination of the crawling peg system, and the implementation of 
the  new  economic structure  would  stop inflation. (b)  State control of  the 
greater part of the productive and marketing apparatus would lay the founda- 
tions to stop inflation. (c) Given price controls and wage readjustments, wages 
would increase more than prices, leading to a reduction in the unit profit rate. 
However, given the existence of unused capacity, the augmentation of output 
and sales would compensate the decline of  unit profit while maintaining the 
overall level of profits. 
According to a high UP authority, the effects of the previous measures will 
imply that very shortly “price increases will disappear and in the future infla- 
tion will be remembered as a nightmare of previous Governments which were 
the servants of big capital” (Millas as quoted in Bianchi 1975). A more mod- 
erate view was stated in the UP program where, as the outcome of structural 
transformations, inflation would disappear due to anti-monopolist measures 
and due to the support of the majority of the people. 184  Felipe Larrain and Patricio Meller 
7.3  Structural Reforms 
7.3.1  Redistribution of Real Assets 
As we discussed in section 7.2, structural transformations of the economy 
were the fundamental element of  the Unidad Popular program. These changes 
were centered around the redistribution of real assets in four main sectors of 
the economy: the big mining sector, agriculture, banking,  and industry. The 
government resorted  to a vast array of  methods  in order to transfer private 
property-both  Chilean  and foreign-to  the state,  and the redistribution  of 
real assets was massive. As a result, the public sector experienced substantial 
growth during the 1970-73  period, as we analyze below. 
Nationalization of Copper and Other Mining 
Nationalization of the big copper companies had been in the agenda of both 
the Unidad Popular and the Christian Democratic candidates for president in 
the 1970  election. In fact, the process had already started during the preceding 
Frei administration,  as mentioned before. The so-called “Chileanization” of 
copper had begun in 1967, when the State Copper Corporation (CODELCO) 
bought 51% of the El Teniente mine from Kennecott for $80 million and ac- 
quired a 25% stake in the Andina and Exotica mines. When a dramatic surge 
in the world price of copper followed these agreements and increased the com- 
panies’ profits, the pressure mounted on the Frei government to expand the 
state’s ownership of the big copper mines. In 1969, the administration bought 
51% of the Chuquicamata and El Salvador mines for $180 million, to be paid 
for at an annual interest rate of 6% over the next 12 years. The terms of these 
agreements  were criticized  by  some UP analysts as being  overly  generous 
with the foreign companie~.~ 
The UP came to power and decided to complete the process of nationaliza- 
tion of the copper mines in the shortest possible time. This action had strong 
legislative and  popular  support, and the  government decided to pursue the 
nationalization  through  a  constitutional  amendment  rather  than  through  a 
regular  law.  The project  was  approved  unanimously  in  July  1971  by  the 
opposition-controlled  national  Congress. The nationalization decree explic- 
itly stated that the state of  Chile had absolute and exclusive control over all 
Chilean mines. Nonetheless,  as the goal was to nationalize only the big min- 
ing properties,  a temporary  provision  allowed the private sector to continue 
operating small and medium-sized mines, although their legal status was not 
totally  clear.  All the big copper companies (Chuquicamata,  El Salvador, El 
Teniente, and Exotica) however, came to be owned 100% by the state. 
The most important problem that the government encountered as a result of 
the copper nationalization was not inside Chile. Rather, it was related to the 
5. For a statement of this argument see De Vylder (1974, chap. 4). 185  The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience 
issue of compensating  the previous foreign owners, that is, the U.S. compa- 
nies Anaconda and Kennecott.  The indemnification  was to be determined by 
the Comptroller General according to the book value of the companies as of 
December  1970.  However,  the president  of  the  republic  was authorized to 
deduct  from this  value  the  excess  profits  obtained  by  the  foreigners  since 
1965. Allende used this provision to deduct some $800 million from the total 
indemnification.6 In practice, this meant that the owners of  the three biggest 
mines got nothing. 
This aggressive stance regarding Compensation has been criticized by insid- 
ers of the Allende regime for opening a significant source of trouble in Chile’s 
international relations on a matter that was negotiable.  Bitar (1986, pp. 71- 
72) states that: 
From a strategic point of view, what was essential was not the compensation 
paid but the control of basic wealth.  . . . Winning this control was vital, 
and its importance rendered quarrels about the exact amount of compensa- 
tion relatively  insignificant. Furthermore, it seems clear that internal polit- 
ical support stemmed chiefly from the nationalization itself and did not de- 
pend  on the amount  given  in compensation.  Thus the decision to refuse 
compensation did not produce any new favorable political dividends. From 
the international point of view, the no-compensation decision and the prin- 
ciple of deduction for excessive profits were unacceptable to the U.S. gov- 
ernment, both  because of  the loss they represented in themselves and be- 
cause of the precedents they set. There was little advantage in thus linking 
the nationalization of copper with a larger problem, one with international 
implications  and consequences  beyond Chile’s control.  Our own conclu- 
sion  is  that  the decision  to  deny  compensation,  even  though  juridically 
unobjectionable,  robbed the Allende government of flexibility at a critical 
moment. 
The government also took over the large coal, iron, and nitrate mines dur- 
ing the first half of 197  1. Comparatively much less important than copper, this 
process had  neither the drama nor the publicity  that  surrounded the copper 
nationalization.  The foreign owners reached an agreement with the govern- 
ment and sold their property.  Thus by the end of  1971 the UP program had 
already been completed in mining, as the government controlled all large min- 
ing operations in the country. 
Intensilication of  the Land Reform Process 
Land  reform  had  been  initiated  before  the  Allende  government came to 
power,  bringing  about  major  changes in  agriculture beginning  in the  early 
sixties. A law of agrarian reform had been preceded by a modification of the 
constitution that permitted  deferred  payment  for expropriated land.’  Subse- 
6. A detailed analysis of these nationalizations can be found in Vargas (1973). 
7. The Agrarian Reform Law,  law  15.020, was passed in  1962 under the administration of 
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quent legislation made it increasingly difficult for landowners to oppose ac- 
tions against property (i.e., it prohibited the division of farms to avoid expro- 
priation). 
The Allende government drastically intensified the process of  land reform 
using the existing legislation. Clearly, the UP wanted to amend the law so as 
to increase the scope of the process, in particular extending it to farms below 
the legal limit of 80 basic hectares. But, lacking a legislative majority, this 
was not possible. In the words of Jacques Chonchol, the minister of agricul- 
ture, 
The government decided, for two reasons, to use the Agrarian Reform Law 
which was approved during the Frei administration even though, in many 
aspects, it does not coincide with the U.P. Government’s agrarian policy. 
We  are using this law because, as a Government, we  are obliged to act 
within the legal framework, and secondly, because any changes in such a 
complex and controversial law . . . would certainly have required many 
months of  discussion, which would paralyze the agrarian reform process 
resulting in great frustration among the peasantry who are pressing for the 
acceleration of the process. Also it was felt that, given the political willing- 
ness to use the existing law much more thoroughly, it would be possible to 
accelerate the agrarian reform process. (quoted in Zammit 1973, p.  107) 
In  spite of  the legislative constraint, the Unidad Popular took to the task 
with remarkable speed. By mid-1972, practically all privately owned farms of 
over 80 basic hectares had been eliminated. Not only were increasing numbers 
of farms expropriated under existing laws, but the occupation of  agricultural 
land by peasants (toms)  also became a very popular way of de fact0 expro- 
priation. For example, over 500 farms were illegally occupied in 1971. 
By  1973 the land reform program had implied the expropriation of close to 
10 million hectares from almost 6,000 farms, or 60% of Chile’s agricultural 
land (Larrain 1988, table 10). About two-thirds of these estates were expro- 
priated during the tenure of the UP government. In fact, the Allende adminis- 
tration expropriated more than twice as many farms in less than half the time 
than had the preceding Chnstian Democrat Government  .8 This major intensi- 
fication of the land reform program from 1970 to 1973 required vast growth 
in the state’s administrative apparatus responsible for its implementation. For 
example, the corporation of land reform (CORA), the most important govern- 
ment  institution in  this sector, saw its work force increase by  70%  in this 
period. 
A major challenge for the government was how  to organize the reformed 
sector. The previous administration had  favored the asentamiento, whereby 
each expropriated farm was transformed into a cooperative settlement of the 
former peasants. The Allende government introduced land  reform centers 
8. During  197  I, the first year of  application of  the program,  the UP expropriated almost as 
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(Centros de  Reforma  Agraria,  or  CERAs),  which  were  formed from  the 
merger of  geographically close previously private farms. However, this new 
form of organization met with resistance from the peasants. In the end of the 
land reform process, only a rather small fraction of the expropriated land was 
distributed to peasants through individual property or cooperatives, most of it 
during the Frei period. Almost all the estates expropriated or taken over dur- 
ing the UP government remained in the hands of the state. 
Overall, the agrarian reform program had a significant wealth redistribution 
effect. Recent estimates indicate that former landowners had a capital loss of 
between $1.2 and $1.6 billion as of  1973, considering all expropriations of 
the 1965-73  period and the present value of the compensations they received. 
This amounts to between 100% and 130% percent of Chile’s GDP in 1973. If 
we consider the restitutions of  land effected during the military government, 
the capital loss of the previous owners is in the range of $800 million and $1.1 
billi~n.~ 
The Stutizution of  Bunking 
The Unidad Popular initiated at the outset an organized attempt to obtain 
absolute control of the banking sector, as President Allende had publicly de- 
clared one month after taking office. During the first months of  1971, the 
government was able to acquire all foreign banks. This was  achieved in a 
negotiation process that established the compensation to be paid in each case. 
But foreign banks represented just a tiny fraction of financial activity in the 
country. The big challenge was to attain control of the local private banks. 
Lacking a legal basis to expropriate the banks, and feeling the impossibility 
of passing such a law through Congress, the government resorted to a simpler 
method.  It  opened  a  purchasing power  for bank  stocks at  very  attractive 
prices. At the same time, it started to intervene in banks based on two causes: 
the detection of some financial wrongdoing or the existence of labor problems 
that prevented normal operation. Faced with the option of  selling shares at 
good  prices or eventually ending with  stocks of  dubious value  in troubled 
banks, stockholders in large numbers decided to sell. 
This process was, as in mining and agriculture, extraordinarily fast. By the 
end  of  1971, state control over  the banking  system was  almost total.  As 
Finance Minister Americo Zorrilla proudly  announced in November  197  1, 
“The nationalization of the banking system is practically completed. The state 
now  controls  sixteen  banks  which  together  provide  ninety  percent of  all 
credit. . . . This process of nationalization has signified that the links between 
financial and industrial monopoly capital have been broken.” lo 
Thus,  in  about one year,  CORFO acquired majority  participation in  14 
commercial banks and less than 30% participation in five other banking insti- 
9.  From Larrain (1991, table lo),  on the basis of figures provided by the Department of Agri- 
10. Quoted in De Vylder (1974, p. 161), from Zorrilla’s Second Exposition. 
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tutions. Ultimately, the state came to control the most important private banks 
(among them Banco de Chile, the largest one) and an overwhelming part of 
credit. Of the 17 commercial banks in existence in September 1973, 14 were 
in the banks of the public sector and only three were left under private admin- 
istration. 
Participation  by  the  state in  financial  operations  was  even  greater  than 
the  banking  situation  suggests.  Several  other  public  institutions  provided 
medium- and long-term credit, the most important of them being CORFO, the 
Agrarian  Reform  Corporation (CORA), the National  Mining  Corporation 
(ENAMI), and the National System of Savings Loans (SINAP). Overall, 85% 
of Chile’s financial sector came into the hands of the state. 
The Takeover of Industry 
Between 1970 and 1973, the UP government engaged in a major expansion 
of  the “area  of  social property” (the state-owned  sector).  This program  in- 
volved  a massive  takeover of  firms,  a step viewed  as necessary  to achieve 
official allocative and distributive goals. The profits of the expropriated com- 
panies were considered monopoly rents, which needed to be given to the com- 
panies’ workers and the poor sectors of  society, and resources needed for in- 
vestment. 
It was precisely  in this  part of  its program  that  the  UP encountered the 
bigger obstacles. Firm owners themselves constituted a stiff resistance to na- 
tionalization,  much more so than in mining and banking and comparable to 
that of farmers in the south of Chile. For example, the method of purchasing 
shares in the open market, which had worked so well to acquire the banks, 
produced disappointing results among nonfinancial companies. Resistance of 
firm owners included the initiation of legal actions against the government, 
which generally had favorable reception  in the courts, and even the outright 
physical defense of the properties. 
The government lacked solid legislation for the nationalization of  local in- 
dustries, and so it resorted to an obscure law passed in the 1930s during the 
short period of  the socialist republic.“ This law, which had never been used 
before, stated several causes that could  lead to a company’s expropriation: 
price speculation, stockpiling, interruption of production, or the existence of 
unused productive capacity in times of  shortages. The definition of these con- 
cepts was vague enough so that most companies could eventually qualify for 
expropriation. There was a caveat, however. Expropriation required full cash 
compensation, as determined by an independent court. In short, the law was 
there, but its use was expensive. 
An alternative to expropriation was soon found to attain government control 
of  private companies. Another little-known law of the 1940s established that 
companies could be  subjected  to intervention,  and thus  placed  under  state 
11. Decree Law (DFL) no. 520 of  1932. 189  The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience 
administration,  whenever  labor disputes  occurred.  Clearly,  this  procedure 
could not be used directly to transfer the ownership of the company. But in 
practice,  this was many times the outcome. Labor disputes were often insti- 
gated by the authorities or carried out spontaneously in order to trigger gov- 
ernment intervention. At that time, a firm’s financial position had already de- 
teriorated.  Subsequent administration  by  a  state-nominated  director,  and  a 
growing  scarcity  of raw  materials,  further weakened  the  company.  After a 
while, many owners were ready to sell their firms to the government. 
The authorities also counted on an administrative procedure to weaken the 
resolve of  company owners. A state agency, DIRINCO (Direccion Nacional 
de  Industria  y  Comercio), was  empowered  to  approve  price  increases  for 
goods and services throughout the economy. By the simple expedient of  de- 
nying the price adjustment at a time of rapidly rising wages, DIRINCO could 
jeopardize  substantially the financial health of a company. This was another 
procedure used to convince entrepreneurs to sell. 
By September 1973, CORFO controlled or had significant participation in 
507 firms.  Of these, 259 had been taken over through  intervention  with no 
actual transfer of property (see table 7.5). In spite of these impressive num- 
bers,  the UP was unable to sweep the  industrial sector as it had done with 
mining, banking, and agriculture. This was, in fact, the only sector where the 
original program  of the government  went unfulfilled,  as some major firms 
were still in private hands by September 1973. The most prominent case was 
that of  the Compaiiia Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones (“Papelera”),  the 
top Chilean producer of pulp and paper and the major supplier of local news- 
papers. 
What accounts for this partial outcome? On one hand was the private sec- 
tor’s substantial resistance to the nationalization of industry. On the other hand 
was the lack of adequate legislation to accomplish this task. As Eduardo No- 
voa, the most prominent legal expert of the UP government, put it in March 
1972, “In order to be able to operate, this government has had to resort to a 
series of legal dispositions which lay almost forgotten. But once having used 
these to their maximum the moment has arrived when there is no legal mech- 
anism with which to proceed any further” (quoted in Zammit 1973, p. 29). 
7.3.2 
The Expansion of the Public Sector 
As can be expected, the growth of the public sector was spectacular during 
this period. The “social area” of the economy increased its share of productive 
activities to unprecedented levels, as table 7.6 shows for six different sectors 
of the economy. 
Having 1965 as a base year, public enterprises increased their share of out- 
put in utilities from 25% to 100% in 1973. In addition, by the end of the UP 
experiment the government came to control 85% of banking and mining, 70% 
Consequences of the Asset Redistribution Program Table 7.5  Public Sector’s Stake in Productive Activities, 1970-73  (Number of Firms) 
Participation in Equity Capital 
Majority 
Participation  No Participation 
with Other Publir  Other  in Equity Capital 
Over 50%  10%-50%  Less than 10%  Entities  Subsidiaries  but Intervened 
Industrial  September  September  September  September  September  September 





































































































































































































































7  27 
8  22 
10  25 
36  45 
17  31 
2  14 
16  21 
0  16 
42  71 
49  83 
3  11 
3  6 
13  27 
0  5 
26  68 
27  27 
259  488 
0  19 
259  507 
Source: Larrain (1988) 191  The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience 
Table 7.6  Public Enterprises' Share in Sectoral and Total Output (%) 







13.0  85.0 
3.0  40.0 
25.0  100.0 
24.3  70.0 
11.1  70.0 
n.a.  85.0 
Output in all sectorsd  14.2  39.0 
"The  estimates do not include agriculture. 
of both transportation and communications, and 40% of industry. Overall, the 
public  sector achieved direct control over 39% of  the country's  output (ex- 
cluding agriculture). 
The Diference between Mining and the Other Sectors 
The  UP  program  represented  the  most  radical  economic  transformation 
since Chile's  independence.  But clearly, some aspects of the program were 
more controversial than others. The nationalization of the foreign-owned min- 
ing sector, especially of the big copper mines, had already started during the 
previous government and enjoyed the support of a vast majority of  the coun- 
try. In no other way would the UP have been able to pass the required legisla- 
tion through Constitutional amendment, approved unanimously by Congress. 
And, to place it in perspective, this trend toward the nationalization of foreign 
companies' controlling natural resources was a general phenomenon through- 
out Latin America during the 1970s (e.g., Peru under Juan Velasco, and Ven- 
ezuela under Carlos Andrks PCrez). 
However, the situation in the other sectors was substantially different. The 
difficulties and controversies of  the other elements of  the program were evi- 
dent in that the government was not able to pass through Congress one other 
significant piece of  legislation that would expedite nationalizations. The land 
reform program was carried out using the laws that existed in 1970, and also 
through  the use of  some extralegal means (the toms).  Since occupations of 
farms and expropriations often occurred in estates below the legal minimum 
of  80 basic hectares,  the government alienated basically  all landowners, re- 
gardless of their size. 
In banking, the procedures  used  were the  simple purchase of  shares for 
domestic banks and direct negotiations with private banks; in spite of  major 
apprehensions about the implications of the government's  near-total control of 
credit, opposition to the measures could not prevent the change of ownership 
from taking place. 
Nonfinancial firms were, however, the toughest test of  the program and the 
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congressional opposition on a list of  enterprises to  be nationalized, and no 
new  legislation was passed for this purpose. To  pursue their program, the 
authorities relied on obscure legislation of the 1930s and 1940s and on admin- 
istrative means. These procedures, and the way they were applied, alienated 
not only the big entrepreneurs (the original targets of  the program) but also 
medium and small company owners. 
The Uncertainty over Property Rights 
One of the most fundamental effects of the UP program on the private econ- 
omy was to spread general uncertainty over property rights. The economic 
effects of such an environment are clear. Private investments are scaled down 
dramatically, even to the point where they fail to cover the maintenance of 
existing capital. As the pace of expropriation accelerates, the horizons of asset 
owners are reduced to a few months, even weeks, and investment ceases alto- 
gether. The incentives are given to extract as much as possible from the asset 
with the available capital stock, while one is still the owner. 
Uncertainty over property rights derived first from the Unidad Popular pro- 
gram, which stated: 
As afirst step [emphasis added], we shall nationalize those basic resources 
like large scale copper, iron and nitrate mines, and others which are con- 
trolled by foreign capital and national monopolies. These nationalized sec- 
tors will thus be comprised of the following: 
1.  Large scale copper, nitrate, iodine and coal mines. 
2.  The country’s financial system, especially private banks and insur- 
3.  Foreign trade. 
4.  Large distribution firms and monopolies. 
5.  Strategic industrial monopolies. 
6.  As a rule, all those activities which have a strong influence over the 
nation’s social and economic development, such as the production 
and distribution of electric power, rail, air and sea transport, commu- 
nications, the production, refining and distribution of petroleum and 
its by-products, including liquid gas, the iron and steel industry, ce- 
ment,  petrochemicals  and  heavy  chemical,  cellulose  and  paper. 
(Quoted in Zammit 1973, p. 266) 
The scope of the nationalization program is striking, as it encompasses all 
firms of  significance. And the wording of  point 6 is sufficiently broad that it 
leaves room for nationalization of just about any economic activity. Further- 
more, the program explicitly states that this is just “a first step.” Thus, it was 
reasonable to presume that nationalization would go beyond large companies. 
This presumption proved to be correct. Industry and agriculture were the 
sectors most  affected by  property uncertainty. In  industry, the  government 
failed to specify the exact criteria that would lead to a firm’s  expropriation 
during the whole first year of  application of  the program. Late in  1971, it 
attempted to reach a congressional agreement based on the nationalization of 
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Chile’s largest  254 firms, as measured  by  the  size of  their capital. But no 
accord was reached. Later on, the government pushed for a legislative agree- 
ment  to nationalize  a reduced  group of  90 strategic  firms,  but  to no avail. 
However, while the government was declaring its intentions to limit its pro- 
gram  to  the  biggest  firms,  interventions  occurred  in  a  large  number  of 
medium-  and small-sized  firms. This spread uncertainty to the whole indus- 
trial sector. 
A similar problem happened in agriculture. The law established that only 
farms  over 80  basic  hectares-or  those  badly  exploited  or abandoned- 
would be subject to expropriation. However,  many occupations  occurred  in 
smaller and well-exploited  estates. In practice,  all landowners worked under 
the threat of  either expropriation or occupation, which ultimately had similar 
effects. 
In banking, the uncertainty was quickly cleared. The nationalization was so 
fast and widespread that by the end of the first year about 90% of the sector 
was controlled  by the state. The few-and  small-remaining  private  banks 
may have still feared some form of  state intervention,  but they were not in a 
position to affect the results of the financial system in any significant way.  In 
mining, the aim was to nationalize the large mines, whose property remained 
in foreign hands. As opposed to industry and agriculture, here the government 
stuck to its program, and no attempt was made to take over the medium- and 
small-sized  mines owned by nationals.  What may have affected private do- 
mestic miners was the general climate of uncertainty  spilling over from the 
other sectors of the economy. 
Could the uncertainty over property rights have been avoided? Bitar ( 1986) 
has argued that the publication  of companies to be nationalized should have 
been made at the very outset and expropriation  should have been carried out 
right away. This, in his view, would have precluded the negative effects over 
the medium- and small-sized entrepreneurs and, to the economy in general. In 
our view, however, uncertainty  over property rights would not have been re- 
duced significantly by such an action. First, the program of  the UP stated that 
nationalization of  large companies was only a first step. Second, the govern- 
ment would have had to publish  the list and stick to it strictly; the problem 
was then how to control the pressure from labor unions, which in several cases 
pursued  long disputes with company owners to trigger intervention.  And fi- 
nally, there was the experience of agriculture, where many medium and small 
properties not  qualifying for expropriation  were  occupied  indefinitely.  To 
make a significant dent in the uncertainty, the government would have had to 
be prepared  to enforce property laws, even if this implied the use of public 
force in illegal occupations. And this was quite unlikely. 
Management Problems in the Nationalized and Reformed Sectors 
It is widely  recognized, even by insiders of the Allende regime, that the 
performance of the nationalized and intervened sectors was far from optimal. 
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came into the hands of the state, especially in industry. Bitar (1986), for ex- 
ample, recognizes that the emphasis on transferring ownership was not paral- 
lel to an interest in the administration of the nationalized companies. Others 
put it more bluntly. Alberto Baltra (a respected  university professor  and the 
leader of the Left Radical party, which left the government in April 1972), in 
judging the performance  of UP management,  stated: “Although it seems in- 
credible, the social area did not work in a planned way during the UP Govern- 
ment. There was planning and planners,  but plans stayed on paper. Compa- 
nies under  state control  did not  submit to an authentic  social decision,  but 
functioned according to the will of interventors (state designated managers), 
who lacked knowledge and experience” (1973, p. 56). 
Neither were management problems in the state-owned mining sector insig- 
nificant, as many of the top managers and technicians of the mines left the 
country  after  the  nationalization.  For example, over  150 top professionals 
working at Chuquicamata left Chile in 1971  .I2 An analogous exodus occurred 
in the other big mines. And the government did not have the qualified person- 
nel or the organizational structure to handle the task. 
Similarly, there were many difficulties in organizing production in the re- 
formed sector of agriculture. Most prominent among them were the problems 
of incentives inherent to collective farming. Member workers of  an agrarian 
unit continued to work for a fixed wage and received a given share of profits 
at the end of  the year.  Thus, there was little link between  work effort and 
compensation. 
Bitar (1986, p. 188) summarizes some of these problems with great clarity: 
“[In industry,] as in the agrarian  reform  and the nationalization of  copper, 
there  was  also a delay here between  state takeover and  organization.  This 
lapse is a consequence of the secondary importance attached to organization 
per se in the UP strategy. It was argued, of course, that the change in form of 
property ownership would allow the introduction of a new form of economic 
rationality, but how this rationality was to be attained was never specified.” 
7.4  Macroeconomic Policies and Results 
In the first part of this section we will examine the evolution of macroeco- 
nomic variables during 1970-73.  Later on, we will conduct a more detailed 
analysis  of  the expansionary public-sector  policies,  centered on their  most 
important aspect: the fiscal side. 
7.4.1  The Year  1971: A Successful Beginning 
The Chilean  economy experienced  an unprecedented  boom  in  197 1, the 
result  of  highly expansionary government policies.  This generated a wide- 
spread improvement in the standard of living of the population, and a sense of 
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total success among UP leaders. Yet  a cool analysis of the economic situation 
could already perceive a mounting disequilibrium, as we analyze below. 
The Measure of Success 
Looking at the traditional macroeconomic variables, the first year of the UP 
Government achieved relatively spectacular results for the Chilean economy 
(see tables 7.7 and 7.8). The annual growth rate of  GDP reached 8.0% in 
1971, much higher than the 3.6% of the previous year (1970), and the highest 
since 1950. Table 7.9 provides a sectoral breakdown for GDP growth. Indus- 
try and commerce were the top performers among all sectors during 1971 and 
showed a remarkable expansion compared to 1970. Between 1970 and 1971, 
Table 7.7  Macroeconomic Indicators for 1970-71 (%) 
1970  1971 
Economic growth rate (GDP)  3.6  8.0 
Inflation rate  36.1  22.1 
National unemployment rate  5.7  3.8 
Average increase in real wages  8.5  22.3 
Sources: Central Bank, INE, and ODEPLAN. 
Table 7.8  Quarterly Data for Inflation and Unemployment, Chile, 1970-71  (%) 
Inflation Rate (CPI)  Gran Santiago 
Accumulated During Year  Unemployment Rate 
1970  1971  1970  1971 
March  16.2  3.4  6.8  8.2 
June  23.9  11.1  7.0  5.2 
September  32.9  13.9  6.4  4.8 
December  34.9  22.1  8.3  3.8 
Sources: INE and University of  Chile. 
Table 7.9  Main Sectoral Growth Rates, 1970-71  (%) 
1970  1971 
Agriculture  3.6 
Mining  -  3.0 
Commerce  -  1.5 
Services  4.8 
Industry  2.0 
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Table 7.10  Indices of Minimum and Real Wages for Blue-Collar and White- 
Collar Workers, 1970-71 
Minimum Real Wages  Real Wages 
(1970 =  100)  (April 1970 = 100)  Differential between 
Blue-Collar and 
Wages  Wages  Wages  Wages  Minimum Wages 
Blue-Collar  White-Collar  Blue-collar  White-collar  White-collar 
1970  100  I00  100  100  49 
Quarter in  1971: 
1  156  123  112  107  35 
2  I46  116  123  127  35 
3  134  105  125  I24  35 
4  120  95  121  117  35 
Source: World Bank 
the rate of growth of industrial output increased from 2.0% to  13.6%, while 
in commerce in 1971, the rate of expansion went from -1.5% to 15.8%. 
Inflation decreased from 36.1  % in 1970 to 22.1 % in 197  1. It is interesting 
that during the first half of 197  1 the rate of price increase had been reduced to 
very low levels by Chilean standards. In the first quarter of  1971 inflation was 
3.4% at an accumulated  annual rate, compared  to  16.2% in the  equivalent 
period of  1970. During the second quarter of  197 1, inflation reached  1 1.1  % 
(also on an accumulated annual basis) compared to 23.9% a year earlier. 
National unemployment registered a remarkable drop, from 5.7% in  1970 
to 3.8% in  1971. Incidentally,  this 3.8% figure was by far the lowest unem- 
ployment rate registered in Chilean statistics.  l3 Quarterly unemployment data 
for Gran Santiago shows a reduction of joblessness  from 8.3% in the fourth 
quarter  of  1970 to 3.8% in  the fourth  quarter of  1971. At the  same time, 
average real wages increased a remarkable 22.3% during 197  1. 
Another  interesting  outcome corresponds  to the  improvement  of  income 
distribution and to the reduction of income inequality  even among workers, 
that is, low wage workers had higher real wage increases than relatively high 
wage workers (see table 7.10). The labor share in GDP increased from 52.2% 
(1970) to 61.7% (1971), whereas the average value of this variable during the 
1960-69  period  was 48.4%.  Minimum  real  wages  for blue-collar  workers 
were  increased  by  56% during the first quarter of  1971, while in the  same 
period real minimum  wages for white-collar workers were increased “only” 
23%. In this way,  the differential ratio between blue- and white-collar work- 
ers’ minimum wage decreased from 49% (1970) to 35% (1971). The closing 
of the gap between white- and blue-collar workers was less pronounced if one 
looks at the evolution of the average real wage during 197  1 : while the average 
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real wage  of  blue-collar  workers  increased by  20.3%, that for white-collar 
workers increased by 18.8%. 
These results were obtained by a combination of policies oriented mainly 
toward obtaining an increase of aggregate demand. Wage policy implied in- 
creases  of  annual  real  wages  which ranged  between  39%  (minimum  blue- 
collar wages) and 10% (minimum white-collar wages), with an overall aver- 
age of  22.3%.  Central government  expenditures  increased by  36% in  real 
terms, raising the share of  fiscal spending in GDP from 21% (1970) to 27% 
(1971). As part of this expansion, the public sector engaged in a huge housing 
program, starting  to build 76,000 houses in  1971, compared to 24,000 for 
1970. Finally, monetary policy was accommodating,  so as not to impair the 
expansion of demand and output: MI increased by 119% during 1971. A more 
detailed examination  of the public-sector expansion and its financing is pro- 
vided in the third part of this section. 
These policy measures were supported by widespread price controls. With 
nominal wage readjustments of over 40%-50%,  nominal government expend- 
itures increasing by more than 60%, and money supply augmenting by more 
than  loo%, the annual inflation rate of 1971 (22.1%) seems surprisingly low. 
The single most important explanation of this phenomenon is related to price 
controls on the private  sector and a freeze of  tariffs and prices in the public 
sector. Two factors explain the relative success of  price controls (World Bank 
1979; Bianchi 1975). First, the government gained direct and indirect control 
of  the  different  links  in  the  chain  between  production  and  consumption 
through many institutional changes. The authorities increased the commercial 
functions of existing public marketing and control agencies and created sev- 
eral new ones; moreover, major private wholesaling and importing firms were 
nationalized.  Furthermore, through Government intervention, credit lines fa- 
cilities were related to pricing agreements.  Finally, vigilant consumer com- 
mittees were  created  at the neighborhood  level (Junta de Abastecimiento y 
Precios, or JAPs), which had to watch that local stores obeyed official prices 
and maintained goods in supply. Second, the overall environment of structural 
reforms, where so many  firms had  been  expropriated  or taken  over by  the 
government, induced most entrepreneurs to follow official price guidelines. It 
was too risky not to do it, so, “entrepreneurs had to think twice before violat- 
ing official prices,  because this  (UP) Government was not like the previous 
ones” (N. Garcia as quoted in Bianchi 1975). 
Thus. the overexpansion of real wages in 1971 was significantly related to 
the effectiveness of  price controls.  However,  workers’  wage adjustments in 
bargaining  surpassed the limits set up by the UP government-CUT (Central 
Unica de Trabajadores, the principal national union organization). This hap- 
pened in spite of the fact that CUT was controlled by the UP political parties. 
Two principal elements explain this behavior: (1) the long tradition of unions 
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Democrat union leaders, who tried to outbid their UP rivals to gain popularity 
among workers (Griffith-Jones 1980). 
Early Warnings of Disequilibria 
Despite the overall bright picture that emerged in 1971, there were several 
indicators that suggested the presence of increasing disequilibrium throughout 
the year.  (1) The budget deficit of  the general government increased from 
3.5% of GDP in  1970 to 9.8% in 1971. At a broader level, the consolidated 
nonfinancial public deficit increased from 6.7% (1970) to 15.3% (1971). (2) 
The credit to the public sector alone increased by  124%; more than 90% of 
the credit provided by the Central Bank to the public sector was in the form of 
high-powered money. This was one of  the factors behind the  119% increase 
of  M1. In short, monetary policy was totally out of control. (3) The level of 
international reserves dropped  from  $394 million  (1970) to  $163  million 
(1971), a 59% reduction. The loss of reserves could have been higher, but on 
November 1971 the UP government suspended external debt service and en- 
tered into rescheduling negotiations. (4) The trade balance changed from a 
$95 million surplus (1970) to a $90 million deficit (1971). The sharp drop of 
the world copper price from 64.1  @  a pound in 1970 to 49.3@  a pound in 197  1 
is the main factor behind the trade balance deterioration. Drastic import con- 
trols, in the presence of an exchange rate appreciation, avoided a larger exter- 
nal trade deficit on 197  1. Besides exchange controls, the main tool for import 
controls was the use of a 10.000% prior deposit requirement, an existing reg- 
ulation that the UP government used intensively by  significantly increasing 
the number of goods included in it. (5) While the overall consumption level 
increased by  12.4% during 1971, gross investment dropped by 2.3%; that is, 
gross  investment reduced  its share of  GDP from  23.4%  (1970) to  20.8% 
(1971). (6) Given the sharp increase of real wages and the tight price controls, 
there was  a squeeze of corporate profits. (7) The first signals of  shortages 
began to appear during the second half of  197  1. These shortages were not 
considered by  UP economists to be  a serious problem. Rather,  they  were 
thought to  be  the natural outcome of  income redistribution policies and a 
symptom of a past disequilibrium problem. The major increase of meat con- 
sumption in 1971 (+  18%), for example, was related to redistribution. In the 
past,  a  high-income family consumed  180 kilograms a year while  a low- 
income family consumed only 20 kilograms a year. Thus, a redistribution of 
income toward low-income families had necessarily to increase overall meat 
consumption (Garcia 1971). 
Answering the criticism that the economy was becoming overheated, some 
UP officials reacted as follows: “If  the income redistribution policy  would 
have failed, if the anti-inflationary policy would have failed, there is no doubt 
that there would have been enough unused capacity, international reserves, 
and stocks of goods, because that would have been a repetition of the tradi- 
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economic policy is precisely related to the disappearance of  slack variables” 
(Garretbn 1975, p. 218). 
At the end of  1971 there were many signals suggesting that inflation would 
significantly accelerate in 1972: the large increase of money supply, the large 
fiscal deficit, the new wage readjustment of January 1972, the practical im- 
possibility of further contracting corporate profits, the depletion of stocks and 
inventories, the sharp contraction of international reserves, and the appear- 
ance of  shortages and black markets in many different goods. However, the 
reaction of UP authorities was practically null. While in the official speeches 
of  1970 inflation was considered to be a key variable, in the finance minister’s 
November 1971 message to the nation not much was said with respect to infla- 
tion.  The  only  mention  made  in  this  respect  stated  that  the  same  anti- 
inflationary policy of 1971 would be maintained during 1972. 
7.4.2 
The decline and full collapse of the UP experiment during the years 1972- 
73 is a clear consequence of  the “successful” overexpansive policies imple- 
mented in 1971. The favorable initial outcome increased the UP government’s 
popularity. In this context, criticism related to the presence of distinct types of 
disequilibria were disregarded as mere technical observations.  l4 Moreover, the 
UP government had a difficult dilemma; a cut of real wages was a necessary 
step in order to reduce the existing disequilibria, but this solution would hurt 
its progressive and revolutionary image (Dornbusch and Edwards 1989). Ide- 
ology prevailed, that is, maintenance of the progressive and revolutionary im- 
age was more important than reduction of the disequilibria. 
Macroeconomic Disequilibria 
Up to 1972, nominal wage readjustments were provided at the beginning of 
the year. In this respect, the wage readjustment policy of  1972 followed the 
same pattern of the previous year; that is, the official policy specified increases 
of  nominal wages fully indexed to the  1971 CPI (22.1%), with (nominal) 
minimum wages increasing more (32%). But again, during the first quarter of 
1972, wages increased more than the amount specified by  the official policy. 
Even the government did not follow its own wage policy, and public-sector 
(employment-weighted) average wages increased by 48% (see Bianchi 1975 
for disaggregated data information). This was not a useful way to reduce the 
1971 public deficit of  15.3% (of GDP). 
The increase of the public-sector wage bill, the large expansion of subsidies 
to the state-owned enterprises (4.6% and 9.5% of GDP in  1972 and in 1973, 
respectively), and the deterioration of tax collection (revenues dropped 3% of 
Decline and Full Collapse, 1972-73 
14. The seems to be a general pattern with Governments implementing populist policies; Gov- 
ernments think that “Deux et machina” type of solutions will appear in the future which will solve 
the technical disequilibria  (Sachs 1990). In  the UP case, it was thought that the structural transfor- 
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GDP in  1972, and a further 3%  of GDP in 1973) generated an impressively 
large and increasing public deficit of 24.5% in 1972 and 30.5% in 1973. (This 
subject is examined in more detail in the next section). Given the rudimentary 
characteristics of the prevailing capital market, a significant part of the public- 
sector deficit (60% in  1972 and 73% in 1973) was financed by  money issued 
by  the Central Bank. The final outcome was an increase in the total quantity 
of  money by  173% in  1972 and 413% in 1973; between  1970 and 1973 the 
total quantity of money was augmented almost 30 times. 
The large increase in the quantity of money clearly had destabilizing effects 
upon  repressed inflation, shortages, and the external disequilibrium. Black 
markets spread for most goods, and the gap between official and black market 
prices increased. On the external front, the overvalued exchange rate led to 
export smuggling. 
Table 7.1  1 provides a perspective about the evolution of the years 1972-73 
within the overall period. The following elements can be observed: (1) The 
drop of GDP was relatively not so spectacular in light of the paralyzed market 
environment of the economy. Growth rates of  1972 and 1973 were -0.1% and 
-4.3%, respectively. (Table 7.12 provides the growth rates for the main GDP 
sectors. See fig. 7.1 for the evolution of  industry’s annual growth rate.) (2) 
Inflation (as measured by the CPI) exploded, reaching the highest consecutive 
levels in the long history of Chilean inflation: 260.5% in 1972 and 605.1  % in 
1973. (See fig. 7.2 for the evolution of inflation by quarters.) Note, however, 
that the wholesale price index (WPI) provides an inflation figure larger than 
1,000% for 1973. (3) The national unemployment rate had a small increase, 
Table 7.11  Evolution of Main Macroeconomic Variables, 1970-73  (%) 
1970  1971  1972  1973 
Economic growth rate (GDP)  3.6  8.0  -.I  -4.3 
Annual inflation rate (CPI)  36. I  22.1  260.5  605.1 
National unemployment rate  5.7  3.8  3.1  4.8 
Annual increase of real wages  8.5  22.3  -  11.3  -38.6 
Sources: Central Bank, CIEPLAN, and ODEPLAN 
Table 7.12  Main GDP Sectoral Growth Rates, 1970-73  (%) 
1970  1971  1972  1973 
Agriculture  3.6  -  1.8  -  7.4  -  10.3 
Mining  -  3.0  6.0  -  3.8  -2.3 
Industry  2.0  13.6  2.2  -7.7 
Commerce  -  1.5  15.8  3.8  -  6.4 
Services  4.8  7.0  -  .2  -  .6 
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from 3.1% in  1972 to 4.8% in  1973. (4) Real wages dropped spectacularly, 
by  -11.3% in  1972 and -38.6% in  1973. This last figure includes a 30% cut 
induced in the fourth quarter of  1973, after the military coup. (See fig. 7.3  for 
the quarterly evolution of real blue-collar wages.) In  any case, it should be 
remarked that the mechanism of  using nominal wage  readjustments to in- 
crease real  wages and to improve Chilean income distribution failed com- 
pletely. It took eight years, up to  1981 (during the “peak of  the boom”) for 
real wages to recover the level they had held in  1970 before the UP govern- 
ment. 
A disaggregated evolution of  real wages tends to present a very dramatic 
situation, even if  the exact figures depend upon the type of deflator used, in a 
context where black markets and barter prevailed. Table 7.13 shows that, even 
within the UP period, blue- and white-collar minimum wages had half the real 
purchasing power of 1970 by the third quarter of  1973; it is also observed that 
white-collar real wages had a larger drop than blue-collar wages. 
When shortages and bottlenecks spread, the external sector constitutes the 
escape valve; a restricted supply of imports is visualized by most agents as the 
main economic constraint. However, the drop of domestic production consti- 
tuted in many cases the principal factor related to internal food shortages, as 
in the agricultural sector. Table 7.14 shows the sharp increase of 51.4% of 
total imports (in current dollars) between 1970 and 1973; while food imports 
increased 2.3 times between 1970 and 1972 and 3.8 times between 1970 and 
1973, imports of capital goods dropped (in current dollar terms) during the 
same period, Table 7.15 shows the large surge of wheat imports from 200,000 
130 
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Table 7.13  Minimum Real Wages and Average Real Wages of Blue-Collar 
Workers and White-Collar Workers, 1970-73 
Minimum Real Wages 
(1970 = 100) 
Average Real Wages 
(April 1970 = 100) 
Blue-Collar  White-Collar  Blue-Collar  White-Collar 
I970 
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Source: World Bank. 
Table 7.14  Selected Components of the Balance of Payments, 1970-73 
(Millions of U.S.  Dollars) 
Total exports (FOB) 
Copper exports 
Total imports (CIF) 
Food imports 
Imports of capital goods 
Trade account 
Current account 
Overall balance of payments 







-  81 
114 
999 




-  16 
-  189 






-  253 







-  138 
-  295 
-112 
Source: Central Bank 
tons (1  970) to 95 1,000 tons (1973) while domestic production decreased by 
43% during that same period.15 
Central Bank  net (short-run) international reserves were reduced to $62 
million in 1972, which represented a decline of 62% with respect to the 1971 
level; that is, the UP government lost 84% of  its initial stock of  international 
15. A similar situation is observed with many other food products. 204  Felipe Larrain and Patricio Meller 
Table 7.15  Domestic Production and Imports of Wheat, 1970-73 
(Thousands  of Tons) 
1970  1971  1972  1973 
Domestic production  1,307  1,368  1,195  747 
Imports  200  367  745  95  1 
Sources: INE and ODEPA 
reserves in a mere two years. By  1973, the level of  available net (short-run) 
international reserves were equivalent to 22 days of imports. 
Shortages, Black Markets, and Rationing 
During the second half of  1972 there was a coexistence of  high and accel- 
erating inflation (at the three-digit level on an annual basis), widespread short- 
ages, and proliferation of black markets. Two segmented goods markets with 
two different price systems prevailed in the economy: the official market and 
the black  market.  The differential between them went as high as five to ten 
times for a wide range of goods. 
The official explanation given by UP economic authorities for the large in- 
crease of shortages and black markets was the following: Shortages and black 
markets were due to the counterrevolutionary action of reactionary groups and 
enemies of the people (“enemigos del Pueblo”); “the black market is the syn- 
thesis of the antipatriotic action of the Conservatives.  . . . It is a lie to impute 
present consumption problems to bad Government policies” (see Banco Cen- 
tral, Boletin Mensual, January 1973). 
Within a context of shortages and black markets, the use of nominal wage 
readjustments  to maintain  the real purchasing  power of low-income groups 
becomes  ineffective.  The official CPI underestimates the real inflation rate, 
and the access to goods offered at official prices becomes crucial. Then, UP 
economists  argued  that  direct  government  control  over  the  distribution  of 
goods and rationing became the necessary and efficient mechanisms to combat 
black markets and to guarantee the maintenance of real consumption of low- 
income groups. 
On December  1972, the minister of  finance announced that the following 
measures  would  be  implemented  in order to deal with  shortages and  black 
markets (see Banco Central, Boletin Mensual, January 1973): (1) The creation 
of  a national state agency (Secretaria Nacional de Distribucibn) would cen- 
tralize the wholesale trade in order to avoid the flow of goods to the black 
markets.  The state-owned enterprises  would send all their production there, 
and they would  stop payments  in goods to its workers.  Special sale agree- 
ments “which will be difficult to reject” would be offered to private firms. (2) 
At the retail level there would be direct control over distribution of goods SO 
that  “all  families  would  receive  a basket  of  goods  according  to their  real 
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like oil, sugar, rice, coffee, meat, up to a total of  30 goods which would be 
distributed by the JAP.  . . . The JAP would define the real requirements per 
family”. 
The impact of an official speech announcing that “rationing is coming” was 
the following: (a)  There was a sharp increase of demand, especially for non- 
perishable consumption goods.  Everyone tried to get, first, all those goods 
specifically listed by the minister of finance and second, all the types of con- 
sumption goods that were assumed to be included in the “basket of 30 goods.” 
In short, the official announcement of measures to solve the problems of short- 
ages and black markets increased considerably the prevailing shortages; most 
families tried to keep home stocks of every consumption good that was found 
on the market.  (b) The political opposition to the UP government became 
stiffer. There was a perception that the Chilean economy would end up having 
the state institute widespread comprehensive rationing under the JAPs’ con- 
trol (where money would be displaced by party credentials and connections). 
(c) Moreover, there did not exist at that time the infrastructure to implement 
the rationing scheme; there were only scattered “popular food baskets” (can- 
ustus populares) distributed by  some state agencies to their political clientele 
and to JAPs located in low-income communities.  l6 
In spite of the dramatic and chaotic situation, the UP government obtained 
45% of  the vote in the March 1973 parliamentary elections. Several distinct 
factors were at play. There was an important increase in the number of “pop- 
ular food baskets” distributed in the period prior to the election. Rhetorics and 
ideology also played an important role, that is, the low-income groups per- 
ceived that the “UP government was their government,” and that they had to 
support it in the good and bad times. However, after the March elections, the 
situation deteriorated considerably more, and the economy started on the path 
to a full collapse. The end of the story is well known. 
7.4.3  The Fiscal Explosion 
The UP government pursued from the outset an aggressive policy of  fiscal 
stimulation. Spending by the general government increased markedly,”  and 
was mostly concentrated on current items. As table 7.16 shows, the bulk of 
the fiscal expansion involved wages and social security payments, which rose 
by more than 7 percentage points of  GDP from 1970 to 1972, and transfers to 
the rest of  the public sector (included in the item “other” of  the table). The 
growth in investment by the general government during the same period was 
16. It is estimated that in  1973 there were between 2,000 and 2,500 JAPs in the whole country, 
with 50% of them located in Santiago. 
17. The general government includes both centralized institutions whose financing depends on 
the Treasury, and decentralized institutions, which generally have their own sources of funds to 
complement the Treasury’s contributions. The latter enjoy greater independence in the use of  their 
funds; they include, e.g.,  the state-run social security system. 206  Felipe Larrain and Patricio Meller 
of  a second order of importance-only  1% of GDP-as  compared with cur- 
rent spending. 
Public enterprises were another important cause of the expansion in public 
expenditures during this period.  As shown in table 7.16, the bulk of the in- 
crease in their current expenditures  came from purchases of  goods and ser- 
vices other than labor, which rose by  almost 5% of GDP between  1972 and 
1973. The rise in their wage bills was more moderate than was true for those 
in the government, mostly because of a smaller increase in real wages. Quite 
remarkably, during 1973 the total sales of goods and services were insufficient 
to cover purchases of intermediate inputs. 
However,  we have  not  yet  mentioned  what became  the  most  substantial 
source of increased public spending during 1972 and 1973: the subsidies nec- 
essary for the continued operations of medium- and large-sized private indus- 
trial firms taken over by the government. The authorities had expected to ben- 
efit from surpluses in those companies, but in practice they proved a major 
drain on public resources. The disruption in production provoked by this pro- 
cess necessitated government contributions of almost 9% of GDP in the form 
of subsidies during 1973 (table 7.16 and fig. 7.4~). 
These expansionary policies  became  unsustainable  in  1973, and general 
government spending fell abruptly. This drop was accelerated after the coup 
of September 1973, which clearly influenced the figures for that year. Most of 
the contraction occurred in the same items that had experienced the unprece- 
dented growth  in the previous  two years; the wage bill and  social security 
contributions fell to even lower levels as a proportion of GDP than they had 
been in 1970. Judging from the evidence presented in the previous section, it 
is clear that most of the crash was borne by real wages. The decline in invest- 
ment was also pronounced (1.6% of GDP), even if  softer than that of current 
spending. The decrease in the real values of current and capital expenditures 
was even more pronounced than the ratios to GDP shown in table 7.16, how- 
ever, given that GDP collapsed by over 4% in 1973. 
The contraction  in government  spending during  1973 was not attributable 
to a change in the economic strategy pursued  by the UP administration.  In- 
stead, it was the result of both an unsustainable policy of demand expansion, 
which ran into bottlenecks on the supply-side and gave rise to very high infla- 
tion,  and to changes in the last quarter of  1973 following the military take- 
over. 
Inflution, Increased Subsidization, and the Revenue Side 
The mounting fiscal deficits of  1970-73  were not only due to an expendi- 
ture surge, as public revenues also dropped significantly  during this period. 
Part of  this drop had its origins in the substantial decline of copper prices in 
197 1, coupled  with  the fixing of the copper exchange rate at an artificially 
overvalued level. The combination of these effects drastically reduced the rev- 
enues of copper companies and thus the taxes those companies  paid to the 
government. Table 7.16a  Public-Sector Operations (%  GDP): General Government Compared to Public Enterprises 
General Government  Public Enterprises (Excluding CODELCO) 
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Table 7.16b  Public-Sector Operations (% GDP): Consolidated Nonfinancial 
Public Sector 
Consolidated Nonfinancial Public Sector 
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Another important player in the evolution of public revenue was inflation, 
which rose from almost 35% in 1970 to over 600% in 1973. Prices started to 
increase in 1972 at a faster pace as a consequence of the money-financed fiscal 
expansion. In the presence of  significant lags in tax collections, rising infla- 
tion depressed fiscal revenues and thus fed back  into the fiscal deficit (the 
Olivera-Tanzi effect). 
The Olivera-Tanzi effect was clearly at work in Chile and helps explain the 
low levels of tax revenues in the period 1970-73.  Indeed, a regression (for the 
1950-82  period)  with  the  public-sector deficit  as  the  dependent variable 
shows that a 10% rise in inflation increases the deficit by  1.2 percentage points 
of GDP. This result shows that inflation has a bigger effect in depressing the 
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the numbers suggests that this story fits well the Chilean situation in the period 
1970-73.  In every year in which inflation increased, tax revenues fell, reach- 
ing their lowest level as a proportion of GDP in  1973. 
The Tax System 
Certain tax systems are better equipped to cope with inflation than others, 
and thus the relationship between inflation and fiscal revenue is neither stable 
across countries nor over time within a country. The tax legislation in Chile in 
the early seventies was not suited to an inflationary environment, even if a 
partial indexation of income taxes was introduced in the late sixties. With lags 
in collections estimated to be around one year, the rise in inflation to levels 
well above 100% in 1972 and 1973 accounted for a sizable part of the decline 
in tax revenues during those years. 
Another aspect of the tax system that conspired against higher revenues was 
significant evasion,’*  the result of many factors, among them: insufficient and 
inefficient policing by  the Internal Revenue Service (SII); the proliferation of 
groups receiving special treatment, which helped to produce a highly compli- 
cated tax system that encouraged taxpayers to disguise one source of income 
as another in  order to qualify for a lower tax  rate; and the existence of  an 
indirect sales tax applied to the total value of every transaction (rather than a 
value-added tax), a provision that  significantly encouraged evasion. In the 
words of Ffrench-Davis, by the end of the sixties “big scale evasion persisted, 
as well  as a number of  special tax treatments which  benefited a minority” 
(1973, p.  185). This process was  intensified during the UP government, as 
Cheyre (1986) has documented. 
Increased Subsidization 
It  is interesting to look at the revenue side of public enterprises when at- 
tempting to explain their deficit. Even if inefficient  management had been one 
cause of the decline in real revenues by the end of the period, it is only part of 
the picture. It is clear that the prices charged for almost all the goods and 
services produced by public firms fell significantly in real terms from 1970 to 
1973 (table 7.17). Perhaps the most dramatic case was that of  electricity; its 
price declined by  over 85% in the period. A similar trend  was apparent in 
gasoline sales and telephone services.  In the case of  other fuels (gasoline, 
kerosene, diesel oil, and fuel oil), the downward trend was clearly present in 
1970-72,  when their prices decreased by  an average of  40%  in real terms, 
while world prices were steadily rising. In 1973 there was a substantial ad- 
justment in the cost of oil in the international markets.I9  Thus, income trans- 
18. The real value of tax revenues almost doubled in the second half of the sixties after the rates 
were raised and new taxes were introduced. However, revenues seemed to be far from their poten- 
tial. 
19. The world price of oil increased  by  approximately  100% between  1970 and  1973, even 
before the first oil shock of 1974. After adjustments in 1973, the domestic prices of fuels remained 
only 40% higher, on average, than their levels in 1970. 21  1  The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience 
Table 7.17  Real Prices of Selected Public Enterprise Output (1970 = 100) 
~~ 
Fuels 
Postal  Telephone  L.P.  Diesel  Fuel 
Year  Electncity  Services  Services  Gas  Gasoline  Kerosene  Oil  Oil 
1970  100.0  100.0  N.A.  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1971  87.6  169.0  N.A.  102.6  79.5  83.6  90.0  84.6 
1972  61.7  177.0  100.0  67.7  69.4  61.1  68.1  57.8 
1973  13.5  67.0  76.7  80.6  141.6  140.4  146.5  181.8 
Source: Larrain (1988), table 9 
fers to the private sector in the form of increasingly higher subsidies through 
controlled prices for goods and services sold by public enterprises contributed 
some points to the growth of the public deficit during the Allende government. 
As a result of the spending pressures and the decline in revenues, the con- 
solidated public-sector deficit soared from 6.7% of GDP in 1970 to 30.5% in 
1973, a level unprecedented in  Chilean history (fig. 7.4b). One-third of  the 
deficit can be attributed to subsidies for the “social area”; the rest was divided 
almost evenly between the general government and  public enterprises. As 
table 7.14 shows, in 1973 all the financing came from internal sources, the 
overwhelming part of which was monetary emission. This pattern is not sur- 
prising, given that the executive branch of  the government traditionally con- 
trolled the Central Bank. 
A different interpretation of  the deficit than ours is provided by  Vuskovic 
(1975, pp. 18-19),  who claims that “behind the fiscal deficit lie the open and 
covered resistance of the bourgeosie against contributing the resources to sus- 
tain the basic public services and to improve the income of public sector work- 
ers; the refusals of Congress to approve new taxes, and the budgetary cuts that 
it imposes; and even an active campaign of  resistance against the payment of 
existing taxes.” 
7.5  Conclusions 
The Chilean UP experience does not fit into Paul Drake’s definition of  a 
“reformist set of policies tailored to promote development without explosive 
class conflict” (as quoted in Dornbusch and Edwards 1989). Sharp structural 
reforms and open conflict were major elements in Chile during 1970-73.  It 
fits  several  but  not  all of  the elements of  the so-called populist  paradigm 
(Dornbusch and Edwards 1989). The main discrepancy lies in the initial con- 
ditions of Chile’s experience. The previous government, helped by rising cop- 
per prices, had improved income distribution and the standard of living of the 
population and had introduced significant structural changes (agrarian reform 
and copper Chileanization). The UP government did not receive a stagnant 
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three years of the previous administration. Rather than stagnation or outright 
depression, Chile’s case at the time was better characterized as one of pent-up 
expectations that went unfulfilled. 
The policy prescription was indeed reactivation, redistribution, and restruc- 
turing, but the relative weights were very different when compared to the other 
populist experiments of the subcontinent (with the exception, perhaps, of Juan 
Velasco’s populist authoritarianism in Peru). The weight of structural changes 
was overwhelming, while reactivation and redistribution were in an important 
way subordinated to it. As we have pointed out, expansionary policies were 
deemed necessary  by the UP leaders to provide a strong base of support for 
the radical changes that were being implemented in the Chilean economy and 
society. There is no doubt that the fundamental goal of  the whole experiment 
was this radical transformation and not a mere improvement of income dis- 
tribution  and  a  higher  growth  rate.  The UP was  talking  of  nothing  less 
than substituting  a capitalist  system with a socialist model, and they really 
meant it. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, the other elements of  the populist paradigm 
were basically present in the Chilean case. The UP government inherited an 
important  stock of  international  reserves-equivalent  to around five months 
of imports-which  provided a substantial cushion for its expansive policies. 
Yet  UP authorities  emphasized (understandably)  that the cushion was really 
provided by the existence of major unutilized capacity in the industrial sector. 
But the key  for a populist government to be able to hold  an expansionary 
party, is the existence of foreign exchange cash (in either reserves or loans). 
Whatever the source of the initial cushion, the Unidad Popular acted with no 
regard for macroeconomic constraints. 
The phases  of  populist  experiments (as identified  in Dornbusch  and Ed- 
wards 1989 and Sachs 1990) are indeed present in the Unidad Popular exper- 
iment. The initial expansion of 1971 drives output and real wages upward and 
reduces unemployment; remarkably, it goes with reduced inflation. But by the 
end of  1971 the signals of disequilibrium  were clear for a dispassionate ob- 
server. Bottlenecks appeared in strength during 1972, and 1973 witnessed the 
collapse of  the whole experiment. Political  instability mounted, and a coup 
ultimately replaced the UP Government with a military junta. 
In the end, ideology proved to be a bad substitute for macroeconomic real- 
ism. When shortages are either considered to be a good symptom of the per- 
formance of the economy or deemed to be the “fault of  the Chilean bourgeoi- 
sie and the international  system” (Vuskovic 1975), when the fiscal deficit is 
blamed on the noncooperative  bourgeoisie, and when JAPs are considered a 
good mechanism to increase people’s  participation,  then ideology obscures 
the perception of reality to the limit. In light of  Chile’s experience of  1970- 
73, the problem of  the Unidad  Popular economic policies  was deeper than 
trying ‘‘a rapid attack on all fronts at the same time” (Bitar 1979, p.  193). It 
was the failure of ideology. 213  The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience 
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Comment  Simon Teitel 
The Larrain-Meller paper describes very well what happened in Chile during 
the Allende government and what led to the failure of its economic program. 
However, one might argue that the experiment that the authors analyze went 
well beyond populism; it was really an attempt to bring about socialism with- 
out a revolution or foreign invasion-an  international first! Moreover, the 
analysis of  this particular case cannot be restricted just to macroeconomics, 
but should include, as the authors do, some of the important microeconomic 
preconditions and consequences of the reforms that were undertaken. 
These comments are organized as follows: (1) background and nature of the 
program, (2) macroeconomic features and constraints, (3) microeconomic di- 
agnosis and performance, and (4) lessons for the future. 
Background and Nature of the Program 
The Unidad Popular (UP) program was not based on an effort to recover 
from an IMF adjustment program or from an otherwise recessionary economy. 
Chile had experienced low to moderate economic growth, as well as favorable 
terms of  trade (due to high copper prices) during the two preceding years. 
Substantial foreign reserves,' sizable unused industrial capacity, and probably 
Simon Teitel is Senior Research Advisor, Inter-American Development Bank. 
Comments by S. Payson are appreciated. The points of  view expressed in this paper are those 
of  the author and do not purport to represent the official position of the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank. 
I. Since the estimates of foreign exchange amounts vary from an equivalent of four months to 
an equivalent of  six months of  imports, by  no means can these be considered as very  large re- 215  The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience 
also inventories,  made possible an initially  noninflationary  expansion in de- 
mand  fueled  by  the  increases  in  real  wages and public  expenditures  engi- 
neered  by  the  government.  By  reducing  real  prices  and  squeezing  profits, 
price controls further contributed to the stimulation of demand. 
Although several of the changes resulted in an improvement in the distri- 
bution of income, the redistribution objective was superseded by  a major at- 
tempt  to alter, drastically,  the structure of  ownership in all major economic 
sectors. The extent of the reforms undertaken is particularly striking in view 
of Allende’s rather narrow base of political power. The UP only received ap- 
proximately one-third of the electoral vote. (In comparison, Frei, the previous 
president, had been elected by a clear majority.) Although the UP claimed to 
carry out its reforms legally, and within the existing institutional structure, it 
is unclear how it could be argued that the fundamental changes in property 
rights they tried to implement did not entail major institutional changes. 
In all fairness, and as the authors do not fail to note, nationalization of the 
mining sector, and agrarian reform in agriculture, had already been initiated 
before the Allende government and had received  substantial support-espe- 
cially in the case of  mining. However, similar attempts in industry and bank- 
ing were more controversial. 
Nevertheless,  with  the exception  of  the  manufacturing  sector,  Allende’s 
government nationalization  failures can mostly  be traced to implementation 
errors, including a lack of control of the processes and management inefficien- 
cies, rather than to strong opposition. 
Macroeconomic Features and Constraints 
An initial shift in demand was attained by increasing wages and public ex- 
penditures.  Still, given the increases in nominal wages (40-50%),  in central 
government expenditures  (more than 60%),  and in the money supply (more 
than  100%), the 22% annual inflation rate of  1971 seems quite low. The au- 
thors attribute this low rate to effective price controls in the private sector and 
a freeze on the prices of public services. Nevertheless, real wages increased 
beyond the established limits due to a lack of restraint by unions. 
Although  all the  initial measures  clearly were one-time instruments,  the 
first year increases in output, employment, and investment, while also reduc- 
ing inflation,  were  impressive.  However,  as well described by the  authors, 
symptoms of macroeconomic  instability were already present after the first 
successful year of the program-particularly,  the increase in the fiscal deficit. 
Other indications of macroeconomic incoherence appeared later on. 
Early  warnings  (1971) of  macroeconomic  disequilibria  were:  (i)  the  in- 
serves, especially when compared, for example, to the level of  reserves with which Peron started 
his first presidency, which was equivalent to four years of imports. See Carlos F.  Diaz Alejandro, 
Essays on the Economic History of  rhe Argentine Republic (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 1970), table 73, statistical appendix. 216  Felipe Larrain and Patricio Meller 
crease in the government budget deficit from 3.5% of  GDP in 1970 to almost 
10% in 1971; (ii) a 124% increase in credit to the public sector; (iii) a drop in 
international  reserves  from almost $400 million  in  1970 to $163 million  in 
1971; (iv)  a trade balance shift from a $95 million  surplus in  1970 to a $90 
million deficit in  1971 (the fall in the price of  copper from $0.64 per Ib. in 
1970 to $0.49 in  1971 was a key factor in this deterioration); and (v) an in- 
crease in consumption accompanied by a drop in investment. 
The first shortages appeared during the second half of 197  1, and by the end 
of  197  1 there were also indications that inflation would accelerate in  1972. 
These indications included: an increase in the money supply, new wage ad- 
justments, a depletion of inventories,  further contraction of international re- 
serves, and the emergence of black markets for many products. Still, the gov- 
ernment did not react by emphasizing the fight against inflation, as it had done 
at the beginning. 
The collapse took place in 1972-73.  Expansionary policies became unsus- 
tainable, and government spending fell sharply. The areas most affected were 
those that had been increased substantially before. As an example, the share 
of wages in GDP fell to a value that was even lower than it had been before 
1970. 
The fiscal deficits of the period were aggravated by the fall in copper prices 
and by the maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate. The overvalued ex- 
change rate was maintained for fear of the inflationary impact of devaluations, 
but it resulted in lower export revenues for the mining companies and thus in 
lower government tax revenues.  Rising inflation also contributed to a fall in 
revenues due to the lag in tax collections.  Public enterprises’ prices had not 
kept up with inflation, thus substantial subsidies were required that also con- 
tributed to the expansion of the fiscal deficit. For example, the price of elec- 
tricity declined in real terms by 85% in the period 1970-73.  As a result of all 
these  factors, the consolidated  public-sector deficit increased from 6.7% of 
GDP in 1970 to 30.5% in 1973. 
Thus the misalignment of the basic prices in the economy (wages, exchange 
rate,  and the interest rate), which favored the initial expansion in domestic 
demand and absorption, when maintained for a longer period of time eventu- 
ally led to macroeconomic instability. 
Microeconomic Diagnosis and Performance 
The diagnosis of UP economists included some interesting microeconomic 
ideas. They assumed that a deficit in consumption (and consequently in pro- 
duction) existed  because  of the skewed distribution of  income that favored 
consumption by the few. They maintained that this pattern of consumption led 
to diseconomies  of scale in production  and reflected the demand for luxury 
goods by the rich. These luxury goods were more capital intensive than the 
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thus, led to a less than desirable employment level. In addition, it was argued, 
the  structure  of production  reflected  oligopolistic concentration resulting  in 
monopoly rents that could be returned to the general population if the produc- 
ers were forced to increase their output and to lower their prices. 
Undoubtedly,  the increase in purchasing power of the population,  via the 
increase in salaries and price controls, gave rise to a substantial shift in de- 
mand that resulted in a reactivation of industrial production with all its attend- 
ing benefits: larger runs, economies of scale, and lower production costs. As 
for the composition effect of this shift in demand, admittedly, there might have 
been  not only  significant differences  in the propensities to consume among 
different socioeconomic classes, but also in their tastes and preferences.  On 
the other hand, the claim regarding changes in factor intensity due to changes 
in the  product  mix  seems more questionable.  Some luxuries,  like jewelry, 
cosmetics, and furs, may be more labor intensive than other goods favored by 
the working class-such  as processed foods or consumer durables. Moreover, 
the employment effect of the shift in demand that took place, by the sheer size 
of the income effect, would be likely to dominate any factor-substitution effect 
due to differences in the factor intensity of  the new product mix.  Still, this 
interesting proposition remains to be tested by careful empirical studies. 
The same could be said for the issue of the existence of monopoly rents in 
the manufacturing sector as a justification for leeway to reduce prices while 
still maintaining feasible enterprises. It was assumed that while the unit profit 
rate of  industrial  firms would  be  reduced, the  increase in output  and  sales 
would compensate for it and maintain the overall level of profits.  However, 
among the reasons for the increase in public spending were the large subsidies 
required for the continued operation of the industrial firms taken over by the 
government. Instead of sharing the monopoly rents with the population, these 
enterprises become a major drain on public resources (about 9%  of GDP in 
subsidies during  1973 due to the disruption  in production generated by  the 
socialization process). 
The cancellation of the indemnification to the foreign owners of mines, via 
the allegation of “excessive profits,” was probably the most egregious mistake 
made by the Allende government. Perhaps even a partial payment would have 
sufficed to temper the foreign opposition.  Instead,  foreign owners of mines 
had  a very  strong argument  against  the  government,  while  support for the 
nationalization of the large mines had indeed been unanimous (This support 
was particularly striking taking into account that the Congress was controlled 
by the opposition.) 
A  failure of  the agrarian reform  was that the expropriated estates largely 
remained  in  the hands  of the state rather than  being  distributed among the 
farmers.  Similarly  objectionable  was the illegal  occupation of farms (or to- 
mas) in the face of an otherwise very rapid expropriation program. Because 
of  the occupations of farms, irrespective of their size, the government man- 
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In order to assume control of  the industrial sector, the government had  to 
find excuses. The unions obliged with labor disputes, which at times were 
also instigated by the government itself. It was also possible for the govern- 
ment to refuse price increases, which were tantamount to the survival of firms, 
in an effort to convince owners to sell their enterprises. These methods alien- 
ated not only large entrepreneurs (the original targets of the program), but also 
medium and small-size proprietors. Owners of industrial firms put up a much 
stronger resistance than those in other sectors, and, consequently, the takeover 
of industry could not be completed. 
In spite of all the difficulties in carrying out the changes in asset ownership, 
in  1973 the government had control of 100% of utilities, 85% of banking and 
mining, 70% of transportation and communications, and 40% of industry. 
One standard critique of expropriations concerns the negative impact of so- 
called uncertainty over property rights. However, the general influence of  this 
effect may have been overstated. In Chile, the main effect probably resulted 
from the “certainty” that substantial changes in property rights would indeed 
be  forthcoming.  Seeing that the prices set by  larger firms were being con- 
trolled, and their profits squeezed, entrepreneurs recognized that the rules of 
the game were changing unfavorably for all of them. This provoked opposi- 
tion and surely had negative effects on planned investment. Even small firms, 
which could originally have counted on  not  being expropriated, could  not 
ignore the existence of an antiprivate economic environment. Moreover, in a 
dynamic context, such firms could not expect to thrive and succeed because if 
they were to grow rapidly, they would soon become an expropriation target. 
Thus many undesirable effects were generated  by  the  “certainty” of  the 
changes in ownership which were to be expected from a Socialist government, 
even  for those who might have expected to be  personally  exempted from 
them. This argument is, to some extent, recognized by the authors in connec- 
tion with mining, a sector in which the government kept the original targets 
and did not try to take over small and medium-size mines. 
Lessons for the Future 
The Allende program had  three of  the expected phases-initial  success, 
signs of macroeconomic disequilibria, and bottlenecks and collapse-but,  as 
noted, was not preceded by  a depression or an IMF adjustment program. It 
was also very different from other populist experiments in the extraordinary 
weight it placed on structural changes rather than on reactivation and redistri- 
bution. The objective was a change in the economic system from capitalism 
to socialism, with perhaps a brief populist “prelude” to broaden the support of 
the government before undertaking major structural reforms. 
The question initially posed by  the organizers of  this conference remains 
unanswered. Are redistribution policies cum growth possible without running 
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real income increases is via productivity growth. Other means to change in- 
comes are one-shot affairs based on using up existing unutilized resources or 
temporarily squeezing profits by means of price controls. They do not entail 
long-term solutions. 
One assumption  underlying  the question appears to be that domestic de- 
mand should remain preeminent and that it must be increased  via redistribu- 
tion. The disregard for the need to complement domestic demand with foreign 
demand for industrial exports is particularly troubling because, while it is true 
that domestic demand will generally remain dominant,  exports of manufac- 
tures are needed to break the dependence on erratic revenues from exporting 
raw materials,  and to serve as a catalyst for productivity enhancement in the 
industrial sector, which could raise overall productivity. 
In this respect, Ranis has argued that Latin America may have “missed the 
boat” because  of its failure to develop labor-intensive exports earlier in  its 
industrialization process (in contrast to the East Asian exporting countries)  .z 
However,  this  argument  disregards the substantial differences  in natural re- 
source endowments that have  existed between  the two regions.  Exports  of 
manufactures from Latin America have been shown to include products based 
on natural  resource  processing  as well  as those originally manufactured for 
the internal market under protected import sub~titution.~  Further expansion of 
such exports is possible without creating a major disruption in industrialized 
countries  because  the extent of  penetration  of  Latin  American products  in 
those markets is generally limited. Chile has been quite successful in expand- 
ing nontraditional  exports: some are manufactures,  others natural  resource 
products such as fruit and wood products. Brazil and Argentina are successful 
exporters of food products, as well as chemicals, metal products, and machin- 
ery. Venezuela is expanding its exports of metallurgical and metal products 
together  with those  of  petrochemicals.  Colombia  has  successful exports of 
leather goods and textiles,  together  with flowers and other natural  resource 
products. 
As a corollary,  given the critical importance of  these exports, there could 
be little tolerance for overvaluation of the currency or for wage increases not 
based on real productivity growth. Moreover, the incentives initially required 
by  industrial exporters should be kept in a sustained fashion and made very 
clear to perceive. 
Another point involves the definition of populism. Evidently, some people 
follow Lewis Carroll’s dictum and call things by the names they wish to call 
them. However,  it must be recognized  that  substantial differences  exist be- 
tween  “classical”  populism,  based  on  the  existence of populist  movements 
(e.g., with charismatic leaders  such as Per6n  and Vargas),  socialist experi- 
2. See the discussion of Simon Teitel, “Industrialization, Primary Commodities and Exports of 
Manufactures,” in The Balance between Industry and Agriculture in Economic Development. ed. 
N. Islam (New York: International Economic Association, Macmillan Press), pp. 315-41. 
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ments,  (like  Allende  in  Chile  or  the  “Sandinistas”  in  Nicaragua),  and 
incomes-policy-based non-orthodox stabilization programs (such as the Aus- 
tral and Cruzado plans in Argentina and Brazil, respectively), all of which are 
at times also labeled as populist programs. Obviously, not all bad  economic 
policies are populist policies, and not all wage and price controls imply pop- 
ulism. 
In recent years we have witnessed the failure, in Chile and other countries, 
of  extreme reform-minded programs from both the right and left. We  have 
also seen that these programs may end up having opposite effects to those 
originally intended-Chile  is a prime e~ample.~  The question then becomes, 
Can such mistakes be avoided in the future? 
The recent political constellation in Latin America includes a new phenom- 
enon that goes beyond the previous seesaw of rightist and leftist experiments. 
It is the popular election of charismatic leaders, who, although running on a 
populist platform,  choose,  once elected, to carry out pragmatic programs. 
Presidents Carlos Mentm and Carlos A. Perez are good examples of this new 
development. Is this the wave of the future? The new Chilean government has 
issued reassurances that the macroeconomic stability and equilibrium attained 
during the latter part of  the Pinochet regime will be preserved as a matter of 
high priority. The message seems to be that whether one comes from the right 
or the left, macroeconomic equilibrium must be respected. We  know,  how- 
ever, that this, by itself, will not be enough to guarantee democratic socioeco- 
nomic development-Colombia  represents the most relevant counterfactual 
example.5 
These days, structural reforms are also proposed as a necessary element in 
all economic programs. These reforms are quite dissimilar to populist or so- 
cialist prescriptions,  and proceed  from  very  different diagnoses.6 A major 
problem arises, however, from the divorce between the reforms that are pro- 
posed, and often carried out, and the means to reactivate the economy. Re- 
4. Interestingly enough, the stabilization cum reforms programs attempted later on in the South- 
em Cone countries, including Chile, while obviously not sharing at all the basic motivation of  the 
Allende program, all resulted in similar overvaluation phenomena. See Vittorio Corbo, Jaime de 
Melo, and James Tybout, “What Went Wrong with the Recent Reforms in the Southern Cone,” in 
Growth, Reform and Adjustment: Latin America’s Trade and Macroeconomic Policies in the 1970s 
and 1980s, ed. S.  Edwards and S.  Teitel. Special issue of Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, vol. 34, no. 3, (April). 
5. This country not only has a record of relative macroeconomic stability but also has had one 
of the longest stretches of elected governments. Yet, it could be argued that today no other country 
in  Latin America stands closer to a violent institutional breakdown than Colombia. R. Albert 
Berry and Francisco E. Thoumi, “Post-War and Post National Front Economic Development of 
Colombia,” in Democracy in Latin America, ed. D. L. Herman (New York: Praeger, 1988). pp. 
63-85. 
6. An interesting twist in the argument has been proposed by Sachs and others who argue that a 
more egalitarian  distribution  of  income is a prerequisite for gaining support from the general 
population for the deep structural reforms now being attempted in many countries in the region. 
See John Sheahan, “Development Dichotomies and Economic Strategy,” in Hirschman’s Thinking 
and a New Development Strategy for Latin America, ed. S.  Teitel (forthcoming). 221  The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience 
duced government size, price  stability,  and  income  redistribution  have  not 
been shown to be sufficient to induce investment, and, without investment, no 
further economic growth or productivity  increase that permits real wages to 
rise will be forthcoming. 
One of  the puzzles raised by the failure of  populist programs concerns the 
reason for a government to continue carrying out policies that lead to its own 
demise. Is  it due to irrationality, that is, the pursuit of extreme ideological 
agendas in  the presence of  adequate knowledge? Or is it  due to a  lack of 
information, thus  reflecting  honest  mistakes,  which,  had  the  government 
known better, would have been avoided so that the government could continue 
to stay in power? 
To  better  understand  this problem we may  have to cease considering  the 
government as a monolithic entity. Recently  I had occasion to converse with 
an eminent member of Alfonsin’s economic team, and I was impressed by the 
reverence that the technician  still held for the politician,  even after fully ex- 
periencing  the consequences of  the caudillo’s failure. This led me to think 
about asymmetries in the access to technical information and political power. 
While the government may pursue a program with strong political objectives 
(Allende), or constraints (Alfonsin), either of  which may render it a failure 
because of its economic implications, the technical imperatives of the situa- 
tion may not become clear to the politicians  until it is too late. If they were 
able to share more of their political power (or share it earlier) with economic 
technicians, and if the latter were able to share more of  their knowledge (or 
share it earlier) with the politicians,  suchfrucusos, as recently experienced in 
Latin America, could perhaps be avoided. 
In addition, it must be recognized that, due to limitations in our knowledge, 
many of the interactions and macroeconomic effects of  such programs are not 
always easy to foresee, in particular those related to how people form expec- 
tations and react to certain economic measures. 